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The Coming of Nelson and the ending of apartheid cricket: Gatting’s rebels in South Africa, 
1990 
 
1990 is a pivotal year in South African history. The liberation movements were unbanned and 
Nelson Mandela walked out of Victor Verster Prison.  These developments were to have a major 
impact on cricket in the country.  An English rebel cricket team led by Mike Gatting was touring 
the country. The newly constituted National Sports Congress (NSC), which had the support of 
the African National Congress (ANC) was at the forefront of mass protests against the tour.  For 
once Ali Bacher and his White apartheid cricket body were on the backfoot. But suddenly the 
NSC, despite massive protests against the tour, agreed to negotiate the end of the tour and call 
off protests. One of the central reasons for this was that the NSC leadership was informed that 
Mandela was to be released and that the NSC had to contribute to an environment of 
‘stability’.  These moves and countermoves were to accelerate the drive to cricket unity and see 
South African cricket participate in the 1992 World Cup, even before apartheid had officially 
ended. This article returns to those heady days and seeks to examine the mass protests against 
the tour and show how the broader political environment contributed to the ending of protests 
and the return to the international fold before the coming of one person-one vote with negative 
consequences for the game.  The article is entitled ‘Nelson’ because in some cricket countries, 
such as South Africa, the score of 111 heightens expectations that a wicket could fall.  1990 was 
the year in which Mandela was released and apartheid’s wicket fell.   
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‘Nelson Mandela? He can’t bowl can he?’ - Bill Athey, member of English rebel cricketers, 
19901 
 
South African cricket historically developed along racial lines with only Whites, whose national cricket 
body was the South African Cricket Union (SACU), representing South Africa (Nauright 1997, 26-27). 
Indians, Coloureds and Africans developed a separate cricket structure, the South African Cricket Board 
of Control (SACBOC) but came together in 1961 to form a non-racial cricketing structure (see Odendaal 
1977; Desai et al. 2002; Reddy 1999). White South Africans played international cricket, mainly against 
England, Australia and New Zealand, but the national team was isolated from world cricket from 1970 
when the British government succumbed to public pressure and requested that the English Cricket 
Board cancel South Africa’s tour to England.  
 
The South African Council of Sports (SACOS), which was formed in 1973 to facilitate an international 
boycott of apartheid sport, adopted the slogan ‘No normal sport in an abnormal society’ (Nauright 1997: 
140), while the student-led Soweto Uprising of 1976 and the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977, whereby 
the Commonwealth of Nations agreed to discourage sporting contact with South Africa, put additional 
pressure on white South Africa. Thabo Mbeki, when he was president of South Africa, reflected in 2005 
that the Gleneagles Agreement:  
… struck an important blow against apartheid sport, and therefore the apartheid system itself… It 
forced the defenders of apartheid onto the defensive, signalling that sooner rather than later the 
international isolation of the apartheid regime would be all but complete. Any objective history of 
the anti-apartheid struggle would have to acknowledge that the 1977 Gleneagles CHOGM 
represented one of the high watermarks of that struggle.2 
 
During these years of isolation rogue international cricketers were paid massive sums of money to break 
the boycott. `Rebel’ tours were opposed by most black South Africans, a point made by Allan Donald 
who played in these matches at the start of his career and would go on to become one of South Africa’s 
great fast bowlers in the post-apartheid period: ‘There was no black support for us when we played 
against “rebel” sides who came to our country. Not that we deserved to be supported by the black 
community - we were hardly playing these sides to improve their lives’.3  
 
This paper focuses on the last rebel tour to South Africa, that by Mike Gatting’s English team in 1990, 
which took place in the context of swirling political change, and interrogates whether the mass protests 
against the rebels, which forced the organisers to curtail the tour, in fact signified a “victory” for the 
protestors against apartheid cricket. Notwithstanding a growing historiography on South African 
cricket, the tumultuous Gatting tour and the various forces that coalesced on both sides of the racial and 
political divide, has received surprisingly scant coverage. This paper thus fill an important vacuum in 
the historiography. 
 
Rebel tours, 1980s 
 
In 1978, P.W. Botha assumed office as Prime Minister of South Africa. Thirty years into power, the 
National Party, party of apartheid, had undergone fundamental changes that were not immediately 
apparent but were to prove crucial in the years ahead. An Afrikaner capitalist class had been nurtured 
in the womb of the National Party that while initially allied to the Afrikaner working class and small 
farmers, their ‘interests went beyond those of the narrow class alliance out of which they emerged’.4  
Botha came into power just two years after the student rebellion of 1976. While a brutal state crackdown 
quelled open protests, the apartheid regime was facing increasing global condemnation.  
 
Botha attempted a grand scheme of reform that offered concessions to a stratum of skilled Black African 
workers and sought to incorporate Coloureds and Indians as junior partners in the central parliament. 
This did not mean a let-up in repression which intensified through the 1980s. Botha’s highpoint as 
reform crusader was to reach its acme in a 16 August 1985 speech in Durban that came to be known as 
the “Rubicon Speech”.5 But as Murray notes, it was to prove a damp squib. Murray writes that 
Botha’s… ‘defiant, uncompromising, and intransigent defence of the National Party’s course of action-
coupled with only the vaguest hints of undefined modifications in existing racial policies-thoroughly 
dismayed even his most zealous political allies.6       
 
Rather than dampening resistance, Botha’s inauguration of Coloureds and Indians as junior partners in 
a tri-cameral system spurred renewed rebellion and gave birth to the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
in 1984.7 During this period of rebellion, repression, reform, dashed hopes and renewed resistance, 
white cricket continued its mission to break the international boycott by enticing international  teams 
while seeking to break the back of independently organised Black cricket through propagating  a 
township development programme, with the support and connivance of the apartheid government and 
White capital.    
 
While South Africa was literally imploding from the spate of worker, union, and township protests, it 
was “business as usual” for cricket. In the mid-1970s the government liberalised it sports policy in an 
effort to ward off the growing sports boycott, but its policy largely failed. To ward off further sanction, 
the mainly white SACU arranged a visit by a ‘fact-finding’ team from the International Cricket Council 
(ICC) in March 1979. English cricket officials, such as Freddie Brown, who was chairman of the ICC 
from 1974-79, and Charles Palmer, who succeeded him, were favourable towards South Africa but were 
bound by the Gleneagles Agreement and opposition from black members of the ICC. ‘White’ countries 
like Australia, New Zealand, and England would have played against South Africa were it not for the 
fear of ‘black’ cricket countries breaking away. In rugby, for example, New Zealand and even Britain, 
played official matches against South Africa through the 1980s.8 
 
An ICC fact-finding mission visited South Africa in March 1979. Its report was generally positive about 
SACU’s attempts to be a representative body but still recommended that that ICC membership not be 
granted to South Africa. SACU sent a letter to the ICC in March 1980 accusing the body of ‘double 
standards, moral cowardice and readiness to “place sport above politics”.’ The English were keen to 
send a team to South Africa but the new Thatcher government in the United Kingdom made it clear to 
Palmer that it would respect the Gleneagles Agreement. The Cricket Council in England was 
sympathetic to South Africa and allowed its teams and players to play in South Africa as long as they 
did not play a ‘representative’ South African team.9 
 
At the ICC’s meeting in July 1981 it became clear that South Africa would not be readmitted to 
international cricket until there was drastic change in the political order.10 It was in this context that 
SACU tried to force the ICC’s hand by arranging private tours outside of the mandate of the ICC. The 
brainchild of Ali Bacher, a medical doctor and former captain of the South African team, seven tours, 
known as ‘rebel’ tours because they were undertaken in contravention of various national cricket boards, 
the ICC, the Gleneagles Agreement, and United Nations’ resolutions, were staged between 1982 and 
1990. These were by an English XI, 1981–82; Arosa Sri Lanka, 1982–83 West Indies, 1982–83 and 
1983–84; Australia, 1985–86 and 1986–87, and England 1990.11  
 
Bacher offered several rationalisations for these rogue tours. One was that ‘his job required that he keep 
the game alive in South Africa, and the only way he believed he could do this was to stage international 
matches involving teams of the highest possible calibre.’12 He also argued that rebel tours were 
important to fund his “development programme” in African townships. Bacher explained in 1989 that 
the programme … 
… is extremely costly…. [I]f we are to keep the momentum going for our development and 
motivational programmes, we are going to have to have tours again soon.… [A] significant 
percentage of all gate monies will be used for the township programme. This, coupled with funds 
generated by private enterprise and sponsors, will ensure that R3 million will be ploughed back into 
black cricket into grassroots level annually.13 
 
Bacher argued that Black players, coaches and managers were beginning to make their mark because 
of his development programme. Addressing the annual dinner hosted by Wisden, the cricket Almanac, 
in London in April 1989, Bacher said that the development programme which he had initiated in 1986 
had taken cricket  
to more than 60 000 children in the black townships of my country and from this has emerged a 
burgeoning talent among players, coaches and administrators that is revolutionizing our cricket… 
Today, South African cricket has changed and now we have a system that gives practical vent to our 
non-racial constitution, where we are giving equal opportunities to all those who want to play cricket 
and therefore for the first time in my career, merit selection has true meaning.14 
 
Not only was this a hyperbole as far as racial change in cricket was concerned, but Bacher was also 
guilty of writing out of history the story of Black cricket in South Africa which long predated his 
development programme. Further, Bacher was not proposing disbursing the funds to existing non-racial 
cricket organisations. On the contrary he was to remain in control of the process. This attempt to create 
a fifth column in Black areas was vital as organised non-racial cricket was an extremely powerful voice 
in ensuring that South African cricket remained internationally isolated. By portraying himself as the 
champion of Black cricket development, with a stratum of paid officials in the townships, Bacher was 
hoping to nurture an alternative voice. Mirroring the apartheid state’s strategy of divide and rule, Bacher 
was probably hoping to break the back of non-racial cricket by creating a web of patronage under his 
control.  
 
That Wisden would give Bacher a platform at its annual dinner in 1989, when South Africa was a global 
pariah, is not surprising in the least. As Marqusee points out, Wisden  
never acknowledged the existence of any non-SACU cricket. Until 1991, it refused to include the 
SACB in its international directory of cricket bodies, which listed the Argentine Cricket Association, 
the Israel Cricket Association, the Japan Cricket Association, the Scarborough Festival and the 
Sports Turf Researching Association. By blotting out the existence of SACB and the long tradition 
of independent black cricket it represented, the South Africa lobby was able to promote the township 
development programme as a benign missionary adventure. Apartheid would be mitigated by white 
paternalism from above, not black struggle from below. Lurking behind the argument was the old 
imperial assumption that blacks were not capable of governing themselves.15 
 
The English and other white countries like Australia and New Zealand protected South Africa as far as 
they could. Graeme Wright, editor of Wisden, said in 1989 in favour of the ‘freedom to play where you 
please argument’, that those countries arguing for sanctions: ‘The citizens of the United Kingdom have 
had a freedom curtailed at the insistence of other countries.’16 Norris McWhirter, who was the 
chairperson of The Freedom Association, which opposed any ICC restrictions, said that the ‘price of 
blackmail is eternal ransom…. Foreign Governments much be taught that whatever restrictions they 
place on their citizens, we still live in a free country.’17 The Freedom Association took the ICC to court, 
alleging that the sanctions constituted a restraint of trade, but this was thrown out in the British High 
Court, where judge Lord Justice Taylor ruled that the application was ‘an abuse of the process of the 
court’ and was ‘launched solely as a device to disrupt or embarrass the International Cricket 
Conference’ which was meeting in London that very day to discuss the measures.18 English cricketer 
and later cricket writer Peter Roebuck, responded to the Freedom Association, wrote in the Sunday 
Times: ‘A few days ago John Carlisle and Norris McWhirter were in court arguing about principles. 
They argue in high-falutin terms about freedom. It’s a pity that they don’t set equality of races as high 
as the freedom of 300 country cricketers.’ 
 
The English rebels never really faced substantial sanction. John Embury was twice banned for taking 
part in rebel tours but was re-selected for his country after the tour.19 As Andrew Stone notes, ‘the 
mercenary players who went on the “rebel” tours during the boycott years [were] welcomed back with 
open arms.’ The captain of the first English rebel team, Graham Gooch, later became captain of his 
country and its batting coach. The second group of 'rebels' had their suspensions commuted when South 
Africa came out of isolation.20 Richard Edwards noted that after the 1990 Gatting tour, ‘in an ironic 
twist, many of the key figures involved in the tour went on to assume roles in the England set-up.’ 
Graveney became chairman of selectors, Gatting took up a senior role with the English Cricket Board, 
Bruce French coached England’s wicketkeepers and Chris Broad became an ICC match referee.21 
Michael Atherton, former cricket captain of England, noted how differently the West Indians 
treated their rebels: ‘Whereas English cricketers who took the apartheid rand were banned for 
a brief period of time, then quickly rehabilitated and often rewarded with high office, the West 
Indian cricketers were banned for life and ostracised from their communities.’22 
 
At the same time that he was plotting rebel tours, Bacher was making overtures to the ANC. He was 
close to Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the then official opposition Progressive Federal Party, 
who facilitated a meeting in London between Bacher and ANC members Aziz Pahad, who would 
become Deputy Foreign Minister in post-apartheid South Africa, and Menzi Msimang, future ANC 
treasurer-general and South Africa’s High Commissioner in London. Bacher explained the rapid strides 
being made in the townships and left them with a video recording of township cricket.23 He made no 
mention to them of the proposed tour that he was organising.  
 
Bacher also made contact with Sam Ramsamy, head of SANROC, to explain the achievements of the 
development programme. On one occasion they addressed a meeting of the English Cricketers 
Association in Birmingham, where each put forward their arguments as to whether or not English 
cricketers should have contact with South Africa. Ramsamy attended the meeting but did not trust either 
Bacher or Jack Bannister, who organised the meeting as secretary of the Cricketers Association but was 
a close friend and confidante of Bacher. Ramsamy was also ‘highly suspicious’ of Bacher. According 
to Ramsamy, most of the audience had little knowledge or interest in South African politics or were 
only interested in ‘supplementing their incomes’.24  
 
When SACU met to discuss the tour, Geoff Dakin, its president, opposed the tour as he felt that the NP 
government was ‘bleeding’ and the tour would falsely raise people’s spirits and ease the pressure on 
the government to take seriously the need for political change. Dakin was outvoted 9-1.25 Dakin noted 
SACU’s deceit: ‘Each year on our trips to London we would enjoy the wonderful hospitality of English 
cricket authorities; yet behind their back we were busy pinching some of their best players.’26  
 
Before the tour, thought, there was a celebration to recognise a centenary of (white) Test cricket. To get 
a sense of the back-slapping indulgence and self-satisfaction that was the world of White South African 
cricket during this period, which made a mockery that it was confronting the apartheid system and was 
both sympathetic and helping develop Black cricket, then one need only peek into both the guest list 
and the orgy of chauvinism at SACU’s 1989 bash. The guest list included a host of apartheid cricket 
supporters, among them English greats like Peter May and Denis Compton, who was a vociferous 
supporter of apartheid cricket, which was particularly sad for many black lovers of the game because 
he had captured their imagination as a masterful batsman. As Bose put it, Compton’s ‘defence of white 
South African sport became increasingly notorious and fantasy-ridden over the years’.27    
 
The Gatting tour 
The genesis of the tour date to Bacher’s meeting with English spin bowler John Emburey who was on 
a private tour of South Africa with his club team in early 1989. Bacher persuaded Emburey to check 
whether any English players would be willing to undertake a rebel tour of South Africa.28 They secured 
the services of David Graveney and Mike Gatting, two high profile figures in English cricket, as 
manager and captain respectively. Gatting became an English hero when he captained his country to 
victory in the Ashes series against Australia in 1986. But Gatting’s relationship with English cricket 
turned sour when he was forced by the cricket authorities to apologise to Pakistani umpire Shakoor 
Rana following an altercation in December 1987. Gatting wrote about this incident in his 1988 
autobiography, Leading from the Front, and was fined £5 000 for being in breach of the tour contract.29 
Later in the same year he was stripped of the English captaincy following allegations of a sexual 
encounter with a barmaid.30  
 
Capturing Gatting’s signature was a huge bonus for Bacher. Rebel cricketers, for their part, argued that 
sport and politics did not mix and signed up for two years, 1989-90 and 1990-91.31 Their salaries, 
averaging between £60 000 and £200 000, covered their existing earnings as well as loss of future 
income due to the ICC ban adopted in January 1989, in terms of which any cricketer who played or 
coached in South Africa would be banned for four years from Test cricket while those who participated 
in an organised tour faced a ban of up to five years.32 Bacher described this as counter-productive 
because it pushed up the prices of prospective players which left less for development.33 
 
Once word of the tour got out, various anti-apartheid forces began mobilising against it. Following a 
meeting with ANC leaders in exile in Lusaka, Zambia, the National Sports Council (NSC), which had 
been established at a meeting at the University of Witwatersrand in July 1989, met with a SACU 
executive committee in October 1989 to discuss the tour. Political changes in this period impacted on 
the anti-apartheid sports movement, both within and outside South Africa. As Hartman explains: 
The social revolution of the tempestuous eighties gave rise to a growing feeling that a political 
breakthrough was imminent…. Among various debates raging at the time was the question of 
whether to start a new non-racial sports body or attempt to reform the existing SA Council on Sport 
which … had lost favour with the ANC because it had become too politicised and had effectively 
taken its eye off the (sports) ball…. The formation of a new democratic body to oversee the 
normalisation of sport therefore seemed logical, in line with three clear dynamics—the emergence 
of new political structures, the proposed revision of the cultural and sports boycott and the 
deteriorating relationship with Sacos. Already in its infancy was a replacement democratic sports 
movement called the National Sports Congress (NSC)…. It would be based on three pillars of 
endeavour in order of priority viz. Development, Unification and ultimately Preparation … for 
acceptance on the world stage.34 
 
As Desai et al point out, SACOS’ ’all or nothing position was out of time with the political reality in 
the country. The NSC was seen as the sports desk of the UDF which, in turn, was seen as the internal 
wing of the ANC.35 According to Pops Chetty, Pietermaritzburg-based businessman who ran a football 
club Real Taj, he met Thabo Mbeki in Lusaka around 1988 and became involved in the NSC. Chetty 
had always seen SACOS ‘as the only recognised sports body and we were proud to be part of them’ but 
he had no reservations about getting ‘involved in the NSC when the UDF called upon us to come 
together and stop the Gatting tour.  Our roots were firmly entrenched in SACOS, but when we began to 
see that SACOS was being hijacked by the Unity movement we decided that we had to switch 
allegiances and go with the NSC.’ Chetty is philosophical about SACOS: “Yes they were sidelined, but 
in a new dispensation these things happen and you got to live with it.’36 Yusuf Bhamjee, another ANC 
activist from Pietermaritzburg, described SACOS’ stance as ‘correct technically but inflexible at times.’ 
He argues that ‘the sports scene was getting out of hand, people were taking part in various co-opted 
sporting activities that distorted the freedom of the sports struggle, so a few of us took that decision’ to 
join the NSC. Others felt betrayed and stayed out of the new structures. Bhamjee believes that they 
made a mistake to ‘take a back seat…. They should have challenged for these positions rather than have 
been sidelined.  Most were qualified and seasoned campaigners’ who would have made a difference.37 
 
In real terms, the NSC was just as political as SACOS. The difference was that the NSC was prepared 
to act at the behest of the ANC. The formation of the NSC was to prove crucial to Bacher’s objectives 
of a speedy return to international cricket. This, despite the early militancy of the NSC in its opposition 
to the Gatting tour. The NSC was an important weapon in marginalising SACOS, which was less willing 
to negotiate the end of the sports boycott until the playing fields were level.  
 
The NSC delegation to the October 1989 meeting with SACU included human rights lawyer Krish 
Naidoo, Ngconde Balfour, Mluleki George, Bill Jardine, and Mthobi Tyamzashe. While Bacher 
extolled the virtues of development and hence the need for the tour, the NSC insisted that SACU call 
off the tour as a step towards achieving true democracy.  George, president of the UDF in the Border 
region and a member of the ANC underground, warned that SACU should bear responsibility for ‘the 
blood that will flow’ if the tour proceeded.38 Despite this warning, SACU refused to call off the tour. 
However, the meeting gave the NSC legitimacy and credibility as a non-racial sports organisation, 
despite its having limited sporting structures, and helped it to marginalise SACOS which refused to 
bend to ANC leadership.  
 
The propaganda battle against the tour was fought simultaneously on several fronts. Balfour went to 
London with M. Hlatywayo but failed to get Gatting and Emburey to cancel the tour.39 Krish 
Mackerdhuj of the non-racial SACB, and Murphy Morobe, a UDF leader, went to London to get the 
support of the media against the tour.40 This move bore fruit as the media gave the tour much negative 
coverage. Ngconde Balfour, chairman of the NSC Interim Committee for the Western Cape, who would 
be a Minister of Sport in non-racial South Africa, sent a memorandum to Graveney in which he stated: 
You are nothing more than a mercenary, and mercenaries should understand that they are not told 
everything by their employers, especially mafia-type employers like Dr Ali Bacher…. We are 
prepared to go out and be murdered and die on any field you will play on … and the blame will be 
squarely on the rebel doorstep, and particularly Dr Ali Bacher.41 
 
Gatting and Graveney were forewarned about the possible reception in South Africa. Peter Hain, long-
time antiapartheid activist and Labour MP, wrote to Gatting: 
You and your colleagues may be completely unaware of the potentially explosive situation which 
will greet you. You can expect to be dogged by demonstrations…. The only way protestors will be 
held at bay is by surrounding the ground with police and placing a police barrier between the 
spectators inside and police outside. The dignity of the game will be irrevocably damaged.42 
 
Gatting dismissed these concerns. He thought it unfair that team members faced a possible ban. ‘Most 
other sportsmen have not been banned for going there, so I am not really sure why there is so much fuss 
about a group of cricketers.’43 
 
Despite local and international moves against the tour, Bacher also refused to buckle to the pressure. 
He completely misread the country’s mood and the changing political climate. Yusuf Bhamjee, key 
organiser of anti-tour protest in Pietermaritzburg, felt that it was…  
bad politics on the part of Ali Bacher and Mike Gatting. The mood was high, the local leadership 
was determined that something must happen and we had a very very strong non-racial NSC, and 
SACOS base and people did not understand that some of us who were soaked in politics were 
prepared to lead. We took on the cudgels from a sporting perspective and the political perspective 
and broader community civil society, and we were able to marry and recognize what we were 
fighting for in the broader sense was a non-racial South Africa…. The Gatting tour … gave the 
struggle a momentum.44  
 
Gatting’s rebels arrived in a very different political climate to that faced by previous rebel cricketers. 
President P.W. Botha had resigned in August and was replaced by F.W. De Klerk. During the 1980s, a 
battery of measures banned protest of any kind. The Internal Security Act of 1982 gave the authorities 
the power to prohibit gatherings while a State of Emergency imposed in July 1985 effectively remained 
in place until October 1990. De Klerk announced on 12 September 1989 that the government would 
have no objection to peaceful protest within the ambit of the law and the following day around 35 000 
people participated in Cape Town in the first sanctioned anti-apartheid march. The march made 
international news and de Klerk was praised for his liberal attitude and the MDM for the peaceful nature 
of the march. Protest gathered momentum and 150 000 protestors took part in anti-apartheid marches 
on 14 October 1989. Marches involved every sector of society, from health workers, to school children 
to workers and covered a range of grievances such as privatisation, sanitation, high rents, inadequate 
facilities, and segregation in the workplace.45 
 
On 18 January 1990, Sam Ramsamy sent a fax to the NSC informing the organisation that Gatting’s 
rebels had departed for South Africa: ‘They’re all yours now!’46  The NSC galvanised its members and 
decided on protest action without applying for magisterial permission. The anti-tour protest was to 
include consumer boycotts, marches to cricket grounds, and strikes by hotel employees so that the world 
would get the message the Black South Africans regarded the tour as illegitimate. 47 A large crowd 
turned up at the Jan Smuts Airport (now the O.R. Tambo International Airport) to meet the rebels on 
19 January but the flight was delayed. According to one report:    
Police in Johannesburg armed with batons and dogs have broken up a demonstration against the 
rebel cricketers who are defying a ban on playing in segregated South Africa. Several hundred 
protesters, many waving placards saying "Apartheid is not cricket" and "Ban racist tours" had 
gathered in the arrivals hall at Jan Smuts airport to wait for the 15 England tourists led by former 
captain Mike Gatting. The cricketers were three hours late - by which time the police had moved 
in, waving batons, setting the dogs on protesters and firing tear gas. Winnie Mandela - wife of 
the jailed African National Congress leader, Nelson Mandela - was seen among the crowd wiping 
tears from her eyes. She later complained of police brutality: “You are getting lots of nice perks 
on the backs of the blacks in South Africa”.48 
 
The opening game was switched from East London to Kimberley because East London was the political 
base of George and a UDF stronghold. But NSC organisers mobilised around a thousand protestors in 
Kimberley at short notice for the match against a South African XI that took place between 26-28 
January. There was a tense stand-off because the protestors refused to get a magisterial permit to legalise 
the march.49 To avoid confrontation, Bacher himself obtained permission from the magistrate so that 
the demonstration would be legal. Notwithstanding this, there was some violence and a car were burnt.50 
One of the rebels Bruce French, recalled ‘sitting in the pavilion, waiting to bat, in the first game we 
played in Kimberley. As you looked away in the distance you could see this cloud of dust. Slowly it got 
closer, and this 'umba-umba' noise came with it. Of course it was 3,000 people turning up at the ground 
to demonstrate.’51 Gatting angered opponents of the tour with some of his quotes. He commented in the 
aftermath of Kimberley that as far as he was concerned there were ‘just a few people singing and 
dancing and that was it.’52  
 
Bacher was wrong if he thought that he could contain the protest through peaceful legal marches in this 
way so that the cricket could go on. Protestors followed the tourists from Kimberley to Bloemfontein, 
where the rebels player a South African Universities team from 30 January to 1 February, and from 
there to Pietermaritzburg, where they played another Invitation team from 3-5 February.53 According 
to an international report on the protest in Bloemfontein, which was led by Paul Ntuli, police fired tear 
gas on ‘scores of demonstrators’ who were attending a rally in a church hall. Eighty people were 
arrested. Ntuli blamed Bacher for the violence. ‘He has a duty to answer to the people of South Africa 
and the international community.’ Black staff at the hotel where the English team was staying refused 
to serve the cricketers and white staff were employed at short notice to undertake their tasks.54 Gatting, 
when confronted by a Black South African who told him that he was injured during anti-tour protests 
in Bloemfontein, responded: ‘What happens in the townships is nothing to do with us.’55 The ferocity 
of the protest led David Hill of the Independent on Sunday to remark: 
Gatting's persistent incantation – ‘we're just here to play cricket’ - was sounding increasingly like 
the response of a man in a dream. Far from being dwarfed, as its architects hoped, by the 
impending excitement of President de Klerk's reform program and Nelson Mandela's release, the 
English cricket tour has become the main drama of South African national life, with each new 
day's events offering a fresh test of the balance between state might and citizens' rights. The fact 
that its key actors are all drawn from the world of sport underlines the fallacy of Gatting's 
position. In South Africa, there is no such thing as a political neutral zone.56 
 
The next match was played in Pietermaritzburg which had strong non-racial cricket structures as well 
as an established UDF-aligned Mass Democratic Movement which quickly organised against the tour. 
As Richard Edwards points out, 
Given that Kimberley was the first fixture of the tour, it was not an auspicious start. Worse was to 
follow. Tear gas and rubber bullets were used to clear demonstrators in Bloemfontein before events 
came to a head in Pietermaritzburg on 3 February. Gatting has never been a man to shirk a challenge, 
but even he must have been unnerved by the sight of 4,000 protesters eager to vent their anger on a 
man who was rapidly becoming public enemy No 1 in England and South Africa.57 
 
According to Pat Bhengu, a local union leader in Pietermaritzburg, the tour provided an opportunity to 
protest against a decade of rebel tours which opponents of apartheid sport were unable to stop because 
of a repressive state: ‘rebel tours just cropped up; rebel tours for rugby, rebel tours for cricket, and even 
our friends in the international community were calling their people not to come to South Africa – but 
these people, they defied those calls.’58 
 
Activists from sporting, trades union, education, and community organisations met on 26 January and 
again on 1 February 1990 to plan the protest route and finalise the Memorandum that they planned to 
hand over to Ali Bacher and Mike Gatting. The memorandum was prepared by the likes of Yusuf 
Bhamjee, Mike Hickson, Pops Chetty, and Pat Bengu. They also distributed pamphlets informing the 
public of the march, its route, and the fact that the march was legal as magisterial permission had been 
obtained.59 Activists were disdainful of Pietermaritzburg Mayor Mark Cornell’s plea to the people of 
Pietermaritzburg to show the tourists ‘true hospitality’.  According to Yusuf Bhamjee: 
As citizens he was talking to the white persons because they had the right to vote for the Mayor. 
He was not talking to us as black people… We were showing the hospitality of the majority of 
the people in Maritzburg, not the minority. We said, you are welcome to our city, our city is very 
beautiful, but we want you to come to an open democratic society in the future, so let us now 
show you an ugly vision of apartheid sport which divided us rather than united us in this city.60 
 
The march took place on 3 February 1990. On the previous day, when Parliament opened on 2 February, 
President de Klerk announced a raft of quite political measures that included the unbanning of the ANC 
and the SACP, suspension of the death penalty, release of political prisoners, and a new ‘constitutional 
dispensation in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity.’ South 
Africa’s main political antagonists, the ANC and NP, had reached a deadlock; neither was sufficiently 
powerful to impose its control upon the future of the country. While the NP was unable to perpetuate 
the old order through oppression and gradual reforms, the ANC itself lacked the military power and 
organizational means to remove the NP from power. With the unbanning of the ANC the march 
suddenly took on a new meaning. For the thousands of workers, students, and teachers who came from 
all parts of the city and surrounding townships like Imbali, Edendale and Sobantu the march became a 
political rally. If Bacher had hoped that de Klerk’s announcement would make the protestors more 
malleable, he was wrong for it emboldened the protestors. They were helped too by the fact that the 
new political climate forced police to avoid confrontation as far as possible.61  
 
The marchers, numbering around 5 000, had been gathering in the Pietermaritzburg city centre from 
early on and began marching towards the Jan Smuts Stadium (now the Harry Gwala Stadium after the 
ANC stalwart), bringing the busy Saturday morning traffic to a halt. Tempers were frayed as it was 
February, the hottest month of the year in KwaZulu Natal, and around 35 degrees by the time the 
marchers reached the stadium. The atmosphere was potentially explosive. According to The Star 
newspaper, ‘thousands of demonstrators swamped fields surrounding the ground.  And there was a 
massive police presence with helicopters, armoured cars and water cannon.  But they kept their distance 
in an attempt to avoid provocation.’62  
 
The protestors insisted that Gatting personally accept the memorandum. He was reluctant and Bacher 
offered to accept it on his behalf, but the protestors refused to relent. Bacher realised that the situation 
was getting out of hand and persuaded Gatting to accept the memorandum on the podium when 
organisers guaranteed his safety. Gatting would state that he ‘went in to the crowd because that is what 
they asked us to do. They wanted to see who we were and tell us to go home.’ Bacher would say that 
he genuinely ‘thought Mike Gatting might get killed in Pietermaritzburg.’63 Bacher also described 
Gatting’s strategy as ‘the most heroic sporting achievement off the field I have ever seen…. [Mike] has 
come here with no knowledge of the country and has said nothing more stupid than a lot of white South 
Africans do every day.’64 According to Bhengu: 
When Mike Gatting came out, I saw the victory of the people of South Africa, what we had been 
fighting for, what we were saying to these people, we wanted to tell them ourselves so that they 
could feel our pain. Even at the podium when I was addressing the crowd,  I said to them: ‘this is 
the man that we wanted to come out, this is the man we want to speak to that he could take a message 
to England and tell the people there that the people in South Africa are still suffering’.65 
 
As Gatting descended the podium and walked back to the stadium while the marchers sang Nkosi 
Sikelela i Afrika and chanted ‘Gatting go home’. Some cans and stones were thrown but the marshalls 
largely kept the situation under control.66  
 
The petition reminded the rebels that South Africa was still ruled by a racist minority; that a State of 
Emergency had been in existence since 1985; that Apartheid was alive; and that there was 
‘overwhelming’ local and international opposition to the tour. It added that by touring the rebels were 
propping up ‘a universally despised system of racial and economic injustice’ and helping to boost white 
confidence. Due to tax benefits, the tour was actually funded by taxpayers, most of whom opposed the 
tour. The memorandum concluded that the rebels should ‘ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE TOUR, OR CALL OFF THE TOUR NOW!’ 
 
While Gatting returned to the ground and the game continued, the march was the catalyst that sped-up 
the tour’s curtailment. Bacher had misjudged the depth of opposition to the tour. Bacher would claim 
that he was deeply ‘hurt’ because ‘people have always known my political views and here I was on the 
opposite side to people with whom I shared the same political views and that was very difficult for me. 
That night I could not sleep. I was really demoralized.’67 Not all who participated in the march shared 
the view that they were on the same side of the political fence as Bacher. Anesh Mangalpersad, 
schoolteacher and protest organiser in Pietermaritzburg, regarded Bacher as ‘an opportunist.’ He felt 
that Bacher sought to exploit the situation to his advantage by shrewdly obtaining permission for 
marches which eliminated violence and arranging electricity for anti-tour meetings. In this way he was 
trying to keep both sides happy so that the tour would go ahead.  
He used the platform that was available to him to give a statement which appeased the people who 
would support him eventually, especially people who were against the tour. So he was using this as 
an opportunity to position himself to lead South African cricket and he actually achieved it, but 
personally I just feel that he used the game because he was fully aware, as an educated person, that 
in terms of all the laws that were passed by the previous government, what Blacks were going 
through.68  
 
The explosive protests which received negative publicity overseas caused consternation among white 
politicians and businessmen. The release of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990 made Bacher finally 
realize that events had overtaken the tour.   
 
The protests and rapidly changing political situation, with the unbanning of the liberation movements 
and release of Mandela, meant the tour was on its last legs.  
 
As Bill Athey, who doubled as a ‘militant Thatcherite’,69 was to find out, Mandela could not bowl, but 
his presence was to have a dramatic effect on the tour.  
 
Samba Ramsamy recalls that ‘at lunchtime on the 9th, Thabo Mbeki phoned me in London…. “Let me 
tell you in confidence … Madiba is going to be released this weekend, and we don’t want him released 
into an atmosphere of violence and disruption. We must contain the situation, and restore some kind of 
calm…. Please tell your people to call off the troops”…. I will do that I replied.70 A similar story is told 
by Bill Jardine. Chris van Wyk, in his biography of Jardine, writes that on 10 February, the NSC’s Krish 
Naidoo received a call from Thabo Mbeki in London:  
Mbeki informed Krish that Bacher’s union was anxious to talk about the rebel cricket tour: “But 
why?” Krish wanted to know. “The government’s thinking of releasing the old man.” “The old man” 
was none other than Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for 27 years. But President FW de Klerk was 
treading very cautiously. He wanted to ensure that Mandela was released into a relatively stable 
South Africa, and the protestors were not helping matters with their running battles outside cricket 
stadiums. Mbeki suggested that the Anti-Tour Committee apply their minds to this and adopt an 
appropriate course of action. He added that Bacher would call Krish for a chat. Shortly afterwards, 
Bacher phoned Krish to set up the meeting.71 
 
Stability was the key to both the ANC and National Party in the numerous meetings that were taking 
place throughout the second half of the 1980s. Stability gave both sides a chance to elbow out 
competitors and get on with the work of hammering out a deal. The release of Mandela made stability 
even more important. 
 
Bacher was backed into a corner. His two main supporters, White capital and the National Party, had 
clearly bought into a strategy of putting the ANC at the centre of a negotiated settlement. Neither was 
willing to sacrifice this so that Bacher could have his tour. A deal had to be made and it was duly struck 
at the home of Michael Katz, SACU’s lawyer. Bacher got a phone-call from Katz who warned that 
Winnie Mandela was going to lead a massive march and that an agreement had to be reached to stop 
the tour. Bacher met with Krish Naidoo and Jardien, and then Bacher and Krish Naidoo met with Katz 
who called Mluleki George and they hammered out an agreement in terms of which the English would 
play one test and four one-day international matches between 8-22 February and the second year of the 
tour would be cancelled. Bacher though tried one last sleight of hand. He released a press statement that 
the following year’s tour would not be called off. Katz was asked to confirm the earlier deal, which he 
did. The NSC felt that they could be betrayed as Bacher hedged his bets and included the cancellation 
of the following year’s tour in the press release.72 
 
The Guardian's Frank Keating wrote when Gatting’s rebels returned home: ‘No more inglorious, 
downright disgraced and discredited team or sportsmen wearing the badge of “England” can ever have 
returned through customs with such nothingness to declare.’73 Gatting himself was reluctant to speak 
about the tour, but did say in 2009, ‘that it turned out well for South Africa. Not that that had anything 
to do with us. Clearly, Nelson Mandela is a very great man.’74  
 
Bacher, recalling the tour two decades later, would say: ‘I can never forget Pietermaritzburg…. There 
was so much hatred and anger. I realised for the first time that those earlier tours were peaceful only 
because if there had been demonstrations those people would have been locked up in jail.’75 He also 
justified his own involvement: 
We lived in a cocoon here, you must remember. Including myself. When we had the previous rebel 
tours there were packed crowds, mainly white people, no demonstrations. I thought the country, the 
people, had no problem. I must confess that if I had known the anger and the hurt that those tours 
would cause, I would have thought twice about them. It was very hurtful for me. I had been a liberal 
all my life.76 
 
Bacher’s defence as a naive South African liberal is difficult to maintain when one reads his rationale 
for the rogue tours. He was clear that the tours were good for white South African morale, ‘a bright ray 
of hope.’ Bacher knew he was doing his bit for apartheid. As SACBOC members presciently realised 
and Bacher was so acutely aware, almost every sporting endeavour that sought to uplift white morale 
played into the hands of those maintaining the status quo. The tours were facilitated by white business 
and the very government whose polices ensured that cricket was isolated from the rest of the world. Tax 
rebates to sponsors and tax exemptions to rebel cricketers were agreed to by the National Party 
government as white cricket authorities worked closely with the apartheid state.  As Mike Marqusee 
writes, in the protests around the Gatting tour and subsequent negotiations..  
… all the myths propagated by the South Africa lobby in English cricket for twenty years were 
stripped bare. The tours had nothing to do with township development or the advance of non-racial 
cricket. SACU did not enjoy large-scale black support, was not independent of government, and had 
not gone as far as it could. In fact, it had not gone nearly far enough—any more than the government 
had. All the high-toned rhetoric about a cricketer’s right to work, about bridge-building, about 
keeping politics out of sport was shown to be nothing but an apology for apartheid.77 
 
While the rebels were summarily bundled out of South Africa, what of Bacher and South African 
cricket? 
 
Post-Gatting: The end of Apartheid cricket? 
There were rapid changes in cricket in the days and months following the departure of Gatting’s rebels 
from South Africa. The first “unity” meeting took place in September 1990 and a United Cricket Board 
of South Africa (UCB) was established in June 1991. Once India, which had led the way in the 
international boycott of South Africa, agreed to South Africa’s readmittance, the path was clear. South 
Africa was given membership of the ICC in July 1991, it toured India in November 1991, took part in 
the World Cup in Australia in February and March of 1992, toured the West Indies in April 1992 and 
hosted India in October 1992. The playing fields were normal again, the pace of change in cricket 
outstripping that in the political sphere. 
 
. On 4 May 1990 Mandela and de Klerk committed to a negotiated settlement which eventually ushered 
into power South Africa’s first non-racial government when the ANC won a landslide victory in April 
1994. The ANC conceded much during negotiations. Those who had pinned their hopes on a radical  
interventionist economic-recovery programme to address glaring inequalities between Black and white 
were pushed back . The end of the Cold War saw the deregulation of markets and privatisation of assets. 
Transnational organizations such as the World Bank, World Trade Organisation and International 
Monetary Fund came to play an increasingly influential role in determining state policies. Mandela 
himself beat a quick retreat from ‘the Freedom Charter’s promise to nationalise banks, mines and 
monopolies’.78 In a speech to the joint session of the Houses of Congress in Washington in 1994, 
Mandela spoke of the free market as a ‘magic elixir’.79 And he saw sport as a powerful weapon, to not 
only heal racial divisions but also to smooth the way for South Africa’s entry into the comity of nations. 
So even while negotiations were ongoing and the apartheid government held power, Mandela 
sanctioned South Africa’s participation in the 1992 Cricket World Cup and the 1992 Olympics. Victory 
at the 1995 Rugby World Cup, with Mandela resplendent in a Springbok jersey, was received with 
global acclaim. This was followed by the winning of soccer’s African Cup of Nations in 1996.  
 
It was Steve Tshwete who chaired the unity meeting where the respective parties were led by Ali Bacher 
of SACU and Krish Mackerdhuj of SACB. Mackerdhuj insisted that any future relationship should 
include a moratorium on international sport, embrace non-racialism, and work actively to end apartheid. 
For this part, Bacher said that SACU accepted all of these conditions and that his organisation 
‘recognized the injustices to the oppressed’ and respected SACB’s ‘profound human rights.’ On the 
question of the moratorium Tshwete suggested that they ‘be guided by the democratic movement in the 
country.’ He thus left the door open for international participation. (Desai et al). This message was 
filtering through at several levels. After a two-day indaba in Harare in early November 1990, where the 
future of South African sport was discussed, Mluleleki George said that the NSC ‘never demanded the 
eradication of apartheid as a precondition [for ending the international boycott]…. When we perceive 
change towards a nonracial society to be irreversible, we will gladly reintroduce international contact.’ 
(Booth, 1998: 185).   
 
Just as rebel tours were rationalised as developing cricket in the townships, international cricket tours 
were rationalised as the way to bankroll the spread of the game to the townships. Farred makes the 
pertinent observation that  
… in and of itself the use of such terms as readmission and return are tantamount to legitimizing the 
apartheid past; it implicitly authorizes white post-apartheid hegemony. It invalidates the SACOS 
struggle, obliterates the history of nonracial cricket, and anoints the achievements of white players. 
(Farred, 2000: 146) 
 
Internally, a Steering Committee of six was formed to direct unity at all levels. It included Percy Sonn, 
Ronnie Pillay and Mackerdhuj from SACB and White, Bacher and Peter van der Merwe of SACU. 
Bacher was also elected full-time director of the development programme. Delegates agreed to open 
correspondence with overseas cricketing bodies. Mackerdhuj and Dakin wrote to the ICC on 24 
December 1990 outlining progress towards unity and ‘without being presumptuous we would also 
project our forward vision to the readmittance of our country to Test Match cricket.’ Even before unity 
was achieved, international cricket was contemplated. The moratorium was all but forgotten.  Black 
members involved in unity talks followed the political lead of the ANC and accepted various 
compromises. The United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCB) materialized from the compromises of 
the unity talks as the national cricket body in South Africa, with Dakin as president and Mackerduhj as 
vice-president. SACU control was perpetuated in a number of ways. Ali Bacher, prime mover behind 
rebel tours, was appointed Managing Director; 11 of the 18 members of the executive were White and 
Whites retained control of provincial units.80  
 
The compromises by SACB officials split those who remained aligned to SACOS’s goals from those 
who were prepared to compromise. SACOS’s position was ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’, 
and South Africa was still not a ‘normal’ society, not even in cricket where there remained a vast gap 
in terms of finance and facilities. The compromisers felt that they were acting within the ANC’s priority 
of placating whites as part of the process of creating an imagined South African nation. They saw 
SACOS as too politicised and as being dominated by a clique of Indian and Coloured “radicals” with 
little African involvement and even less involvement in the townships. According to Hickson, 
Mackerdhuj and his supporters felt that SACOS failed to develop alternative ideas and, in what was an 
even greater indictment, failed to develop a mass-based support.  Mackerdhuj came to believe that 
aligning with the NSC was the correct action at that particular juncture in South Africa’s sporting and 
political history.81 SACOS became ineffectual and dormant for all intents and purposes.82  
 
But five or six years into the new era, complaints begin surfacing about a lack of transformation. The 
all-white team that represented South Africa in its first official tour, to India in November 1991, set the 
template. Black cricketers made little headway at provincial and national levels, charges that continue 
two decades into democratic South Africa. The trajectory in cricket matched that at the political level. 
The call for nationalization was jettisoned and fundamental economic relations left intact to engender 
business confidence. Julius Malema, leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters, addressing the Oxford 
Union in the United Kingdom in November 2015, said that ‘a collective of the ANC has compromised 
the Freedom Charter.’ This started with Mandela who, according to Malema, failed to live up to the 
ideals of the Freedom Charter: 
The deviation from the Freedom Charter was the beginning of the selling out of the revolution. But 
why did Nelson Mandela sell out the Freedom Charter? When Mandela returned from prison he got 
separated with Winnie Mandela and went to stay in a house of the rich white men... He was looked 
after by the Oppenheimers…. Nelson Mandela used to attend the club meetings of those white men 
who owned the South African economy at the time.83 
 
As we write this, across the country South Africa is beset by protests, often violent, at universities over 
free education and housing, in the townships over service delivery, and by the unemployed over lack of 
work. This same tension is evident in cricket where issues of transformation continue to beset the game. 
Disillusionment with the way cricket has shaped since 1990 should not detract from the powerful 
achievement of the protestors.  They forced the hand of Bacher into taking a conciliatory approach and 
cutting short the tour. But the question that many are still asking, who were the real victors?  
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